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A. Definition of "Health Care Provider"
In its 1989 session, the General Assembly amended several medi-
cal malpractice statutes. Perhaps the most important changes ex-
panded the definition of "health care provider"' under the Medical
Malpractice Act (the "Act"), and clarified the qualification re-
quirements for expert witnesses. 2
Only health care providers, as defined by the Act, receive the
Act's protection. Such protection includes mandatory notices of
claims as a condition precedent to filing suit,3 review panels,4 and,
most importantly, the limitation on monetary recovery.5 Under
former section 8.01-581.15 of the Code of Virginia (the "Code"),6 a
health care provider under the Act was defined as any entity li-
censed by the Commonwealth to provide health care.7 A conflict
arose in the circuit courts over whether unlicensed corporations
made up of licensed physicians were "health care providers." 8 The
General Assembly resolved the issue by including as health care
providers under the Act, "professional corporation[s], all of whose
shareholders are . . . licensed to provide health care services." 9
* The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Nathan Smith for his work on
this article.
** B.A., 1965, Bridgewater College; J.D., 1970, University of Virginia.
B.A., 1980, Virginia Military Institute; J.D., 1983, Wake Forest University.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
2. Id. § 8.01-581.20.
3. Id. § 8.01-581.2 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
4. Id. § 8.01-581.3 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
5. Id. § 8.01-581.15.
6. Id. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
7. The former version of section 8.01-581.15 of the Code of Virginia referred to section
8.01-581.1 for a definition of health care provider. Id.
8. See Samuel v. V.C.U. Obstetrics & Gynecology Ass'n., 13 Va. Cir. 364 (1988) (ruling
that an unlicensed corporation made up of licensed doctors was not a health care provider,
but acknowledging that the court in Francis v. McEntee, Nos. 86-L-83, 86-L-84 (Henrico
County July 15, 1988), held that such a corporation was a health care provider.)
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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B. Qualification of Expert Witness
The General Assembly also simplified the qualification require-
ments for expert witnesses to testify on the appropriate standard
of care. 10 Before 1989, the only statutory requirement for qualifica-
tion of expert witnesses was that they be "familiar with the state-
wide standard of care."" The 1989 revision created specific pre-
sumptions concerning medical experts which make the
qualification of expert witnesses easier. The change provides that
physicians licensed in Virginia, in the relevant field of medicine,
and physicians licensed in another state who are eligible to be li-
censed in Virginia by endorsement, are presumed to be familiar
with the appropriate standard of care.'2 However, what the legisla-
ture gave with one hand, it may have taken away with the other.
The same statutory amendment added a requirement that, in or-
der to qualify as an expert on the standard of care, a physician
must have been engaged in an active clinical practice in the spe-
cialty in which he proposes to testify within one year of the alleged
act.' The Act does not specify if the required clinical practice
must precede or may follow the act of alleged malpractice.
C. Statutes of Limitation
Another bill passed by the General Assembly in 1989 clarified
the statute of limitation tolling provisions for medical malpractice
claims.' 4 The usual statute of limitation for medical malpractice
actions is two years. 5 A notice of claim for medical malpractice
tolls the statute of limitation for 120 days following the filing of
the notice of claim.'" This provision is intended to avoid unfairness
to the plaintiff who must wait ninety days after giving notice of
claim to file suit. 7 The former statute stated that the filing of the
notice of claim would toll the statute of limitations "for and in-
cluding a period of 120 days from the date such statute of limita-
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
11. Id. § 8.01-581.20(A) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
12. Id. § 8.01-581.20(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
13. Id.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.9 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
15. Id. § 8.01-243 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989); see also Grubbs v. Rawls, 235 Va.
607, 369 S.E.2d 683 (1988).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.9 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
17. Baker v. Zirkle, 226 Va. 7, 307 S.E.2d 234 (1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (Repl.
Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
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tions would otherwise run.""8 The emphasized language caused
confusion and was construed to mean that regardless of when a
notice of claim was filed, the statute of limitation was extended to
the maximum two years plus 120 days.' 9 Additionally, if a medical
review panel was requested, the statute of limitation would be ex-
tended to two years plus 120 days or until sixty days after rendi-
tion of the panel's opinion, whichever was later. 0
The 1989 bill clarified the ambiguities and brought the statute in
line with Horn2 and the General Assembly's apparent original in-
tent. The amendment deleted the emphasized language, and now
states that the statute of limitation is tolled "for a period of 120
days from the date notice is given or for 60 days following the date
of issuance of any opinion by the medical review panel, whichever
is later. '22
D. Miscellaneous
Two other bills passed by the General Assembly in 1989 modi-
fied medical malpractice statutes.23 One bill amended section 8.01-
581.2 of the Code of Virginia24 and now requires that when claims
arising from the same incident are made against multiple health
care providers, all the health care providers must be named in a
single notice of claim and in any subsequent panel proceeding.25
This codifies the present Rule 2(e) of the Medical Malpractice
Rules of Practice. 6
The other change added psychologists and podiatrists to the list
of health care providers granted immunity for testimony given to
medical review boards and committees.27
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.9 (Repl. Vol. 1984) (emphasis added).
19. Horn v. Abernathy, 231 Va. 228, 343 S.E.2d 318 (1986); see also Dye v. Staley, 226 Va.
15, 307 S.E.2d 237 (1983); Baker, 226 Va. at 7, 307 S.E.2d at 234.
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.9 (RepI. Vol. 1984).
21. 231 Va. at 228, 343 S.E.2d at 318.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.9 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
23. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.2, -581.16 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
24. Id. § 8.01-581.2.
25. Id.
26. VA. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RULES OF PRACTICE CODE R. 2(e) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.16 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
In 1988 and the first half of 1989, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Virginia decided several
significant issues with regard to medical malpractice. In addition,
the Virginia circuit courts continued a steady flow of decisions con-
struing the Medical Malpractice Act.
A. Notice of Claim
1. Specificity
Virginia law requires that before a medical malpractice action
may be filed, the claimant must give the health care provider a
written notice of the claim which states the time and a reasonable
description of the alleged act(s) of malpractice.2 s Since the Medical
Malpractice Act was passed in 1976, the plaintiff and defense bars
have litigated the degree of specificity required for a notice of
claim for medical malpractice. In 1988, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia offered some guidance in this area.
In Grubbs v. Rawls,2 9 the notice of claim alleged "negligent
treatment and surgery of the . . . patient while under your care."3
The defendants asserted that this language was insufficient to sup-
port an allegation of negligent post-operative care in the subse-
quent motion for judgement. The supreme court held that the no-
tice was "barely sufficient" 3' under section 8.01-581.2(A) of the
Code,32 stating that a notice may be in general terms and need not
be a particularized statement of the claim. 33
2. When Required
A notice of claim is required only if (1) the cause of action is for
medical malpractice, and (2) the potential defendant is a health
care provider. 4 A medical malpractice claim is defined as any tort
claim against a health care provider arising from health services
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
29. 235 Va. 607, 369 S.E.2d 683 (1988).
30. 235 Va. at 614, 369 S.E.2d at 687.
31. Id.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
33. Grubbs, 235 Va. at 614, 369 S.E.2d at 687.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
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which were rendered or which should have been rendered 3 5 This is
true even if the allegedly negligent act was also a nonmedical tort
such as battery36 or adultery.3 7
Further, the statute provides that a health care provider is any
entity licensed by the Commonwealth to provide health care ser-
vices, including all employees and agents of any such health care
provider."8 As previously discussed, the licensing requirement por-
tion of the definition of health care provider had led to a split in
the circuits on what types of business organizations qualify as
health care providers.3 9 The question was posed, did unlicensed
physicians qualify for protection under the Act? Based upon the
licensed/unlicensed distinction, some circuit courts had held that
professional corporations not licensed by the Commonwealth to
provide health care services did not qualify as health care provid-
ers and, consequently, were not subject to the provisions of the
Act.40 Other cases held that professional corporations made up of
physicians providing health care services who are licensed by the
Commonwealth nevertheless qualified as health care providers
under the Act.41 In a different context, a clinical laboratory which
was neither licensed by the Commonwealth nor an agent or em-
ployee of licensed physicians was held not to be a health care
provider.42
However, as discussed in Section I, in 1989, the General Assem-
bly broadened the scope of the Medical Malpractice Act by adding
unlicensed corporations made up of licensed physicians to the defi-
nition of "health care provider" in section 8.01-581.1 of the Code.43
In Brumback v. Horng,44 the plaintiff's attorney gave notice to
two unrelated doctors, individually, of a claim for medical mal-
practice. Upon objection to the notice, the claimant attempted to
amend the notice of claim without seeking leave of court and sent
35. Id. § 8.01-581.1.
36. Glisson v. Loxley, 235 Va. 62, 366 S.E.2d 68 (1988).
37. Smith v. Teunis, Nos. L-84329, L-86271 (Fairfax County May 25, 1989).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
39. See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
40. Samuel v. V.C.U. Obstetrics & Gynecology Ass'n, 13 Va. Cir. 364 (1988); Gressman v.
Peoples Serv. Drug Stores, 10 Va. Cir. 397 (1988).
41. Francis v. McEntee, Nos. 86-L-83, 86-L-84 (Henrico County July 15, 1988); Harter v.
McAllister, No. 87-L-119 (City of Winchester May 10, 1988).
42. Richman v. National Health Labs, Inc., 235 Va. 353, 367 S.E.2d 508 (1988).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
44. No. 88-L-124 (City of Winchester Apr. 28, 1989).
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a "supplementary" notice of claim. 45 Neither notice gave any indi-
cation of a claim against the partners or the partnership of one of
the physicians, nor was the notice sent to them. The subsequent
motion for judgment included the two physicians and the partners
and the partnership of one of the defendant physicians.46
The partners and partnership pleaded the statute of limitation
since they never received statutory notice, and claimed that the
plaintiff could not benefit from the tolling provisions of the Act.
Thus, they argued that the action was time barred. The claimant
countered by citing section 50-12 of the Code of Virginia,47 which
provides that notice to one partner, of partnership matters, is no-
tice to all partners and to the partnership. The partners and the
partnership argued that the Medical Malpractice Act requires spe-
cific notice to each individual health care provider, and that the
notice required by section 8.01-581.2 of the Code.41 is in addition
to what otherwise would be required by section 50-12 of the
Code.49 The trial judge adopted the argument of the unnoticed
partners and the partnership and sustained the plea of the statute
of limitation as to the partners and partnership who had not been
listed in the original notice.50 This appears to be the first judicial
ruling in Virginia which construes the relationship between the no-
tice provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act and the Uniform
Partnership Act.
3. Amendments to Notices of Claim
The significance of amendments to such notices is that acts of
malpractice which have not been so noticed may not later be in-
cluded in an action at law.5' In Francis v. McEntee,5' the trial
judge refused to permit amendments to notices of claim on the ba-
sis that approximately six years had passed since the incident al-
leged to constitute medical malpractice, and at the time of the
hearing on the motion to amend, the action had been pending for
45. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2:1 (Rep. Vol. 1984).
46. Brumback, No. 88-L-124, slip op. at 2.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-12 (Rep. Vol. 1986) (part of the Uniform Partnership Act).
48. Id. § 8.01-581.2 (Rep. Vol. 1984).
49. Id. § 50-12 (Rep. Vol. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
50. Brumback, No. 88-L-124, slip op. at 7-8.
51. See Grubbs v. Rawls, 235 Va. 607, 614, 369 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1988); Voss v. Puray, 10
Va. Cir. 32, 34-35 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
52. 13 Va. Cir. 357 (1988).
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over two years. 3 The court stated that granting leave to amend the
notice of claim after the expiration of such an extended period of
time would not further the ends of justice,54 as required in section
8.01-581.2:1 of the Code of Virginia.55 The court did not discuss
the application of a provision in section 8.01-581.2:1 of the Code56
which prohibits amendment of notice after expiration of the stat-
ute of limitation, even though the limitation period for the parents'
claims for emotional distress had expired.57
4. Tolling the Statute of Limitation
The notice of claim is also significant because it activates a
ninety-day period within which the plaintiff is forbidden from fil-
ing suit,58 and because it activates the tolling provision for the
statute of limitation.5 9
In Edwards v. City of Portsmouth,0 the plaintiff in a medical
malpractice action filed suit against a health care provider three
days after having given notice of claim to the health care provider.
The decision of the circuit court dismissed the claim for lack of
jurisdiction.6 Edwards was appealed to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia which affirmed the circuit court, holding that the filing of the
suit three days after giving notice was "untimely" under section
8.01-581.2 of the Code.2
In Scarpa v. Melziq,63 the supreme court considered the issue of
when a statute of limitation begins to run. In Scarpa, the plaintiff
underwent a faulty tubal ligation in which her left fallopian tube
was not severed, allegedly due to medical negligence.6 4 Four years
53. Francis, 13 Va. Cir. at 358-59.
54. Id. at 358.
55. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.01-581.2:1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
56. Id.
57. Francis, 13 Va. Cir. at 358-59.
58. Baker v. Zirkle, 226 Va. 7, 13, 307 S.E.2d 234, 236 (1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2
(Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.9 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
60. Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, L-86-171 (City of Portsmouth May 6, 1986).
61. Id.; see also Morrison v. Bestler, 8 Va. Cir. 456 (1987); Equino v. Jefferson Indus.
Medical Clinic, P.C., 9 Va. Cir. 80 (1987).
62. Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 172, 375 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1989); see VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (Repl. Vol. 1984); see also Villatoro v. Solano, No. L-88-768 (Arling-
ton County Mar. 1, 1989).
63. 237 Va. -, 379 S.E.2d 307 (1989).
64. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 308.
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later she became pregnant. She filed suit within two years of be-
coming pregnant arguing that her cause of action accrued when she
became pregnant because until then she had not been damaged.
She contended that no injury had occurred at the time of the oper-
ation because her left fallopian tube had not been injured, and she
had consented to the operation. The court found, however, that an
injury had occurred at the time of the operation by the "tortious"
omission of neglecting to sever a fallopian tube. 5 The court further
reasoned that she "had consented to an adequate, effective sterili-
zation procedure, not to an inadequate and ineffective one."' 66 For
these reasons, the court ruled that the statute of limitation began
to run at the time of the operation, which rendered the plaintiff's
claim untimely.67
5. Informed Consent
Lastly, in the case of DeRosa v. Meloni,68 the circuit court held
that failure of a physician to obtain informed consent is an inde-
pendent act of malpractice and subject to dismissal from a motion
for judgment if not specifically included in a notice of claim.
B. Limitation of Actions
Prior to 1988, it was not clear whether Virginia followed the con-
tinuing treatment rule with respect to the accrual of a cause of
action in relation to the statute of limitation for medical malprac-
tice.69 Farley v. Danaceau7 and Fenton v. Goode71 suggest that a
medical malpractice plaintiff's cause of action accrue at the time of
the alleged act of malpractice, regardless of whether the patient
continued treatment with the defendant physician or when the act
of negligence was discovered. In Grubbs v. Rawls,7 12 the Supreme
Court of Virginia explained that the Farley-Fenton rule is actually
one of continuing treatment, 3 dispelling any remaining doubt by
65. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 310.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. DeRosa v. Meloni, 14 Va. Cir. 62, 64 (1988).
69. See Farley v. Danaceau, 220 Va. 1, 255 S.E.2d 349 (1979); Farley v. Goode, 219 Va.
969, 252 S.E.2d 594 (1979).
70. 220 Va. at 2, 255 S.E.2d at 350.
71. 219 Va. at 976, 252 S.E.2d at 599.
72. 235 Va. 607, 369 S.E.2d 683 (1988).
73. Id. at 613, 369 S.E.2d at 687.
738 [Vol. 23:731
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stating that "Virginia has a true continuing treatment rule. 7 4
Thus, the statute of limitation for acts of medical malpractice 75
does not begin to run until the course of treatment on that same or
related illness or injury terminates..7  This is true even if there is
no allegation that additional or continuing negligence occurred in
the course of subsequent treatment."
In Justice v. Natvig,7 s the Supreme Court of Virginia followed
Grubbs and applied the continuing treatment rule, even though
the defendant physician had performed eight years of proper treat-
ment since the alleged negligent operation. 9
C. Sovereign Immunity
"The doctrine of sovereign immunity is 'alive and well' in
Virginia. ' '8°
In Edwards v. City of Portsmouth,sl the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia was called upon to decide whether the cloak of sovereign im-
munity protected a city government from the alleged negligence of
ambulance personnel with whom the city had contracted to pro-
vide ambulance services to city residents. The plaintiffs argued
that the provision of ambulance services by the city was not a gov-
ernmental function because the ambulance services were provided
for a fee to the company, were unavailable to citizens who did not
pay a fee, were not historically provided by governmental entities,
and were concurrently provided by private entities.8 2 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the provision of ambu-
lance services was an exercise of the government's police power to
protect the public health and safety, and thus qualified as a gov-
ernmental function. 3 From this it followed that the city was pro-
tected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.8 4
74. Id.
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
76. Grubbs, 235 Va. at 613, 369 S.E.2d at 687.
77. Id.
78. No. 880077 (City of Richmond June 9, 1989).
79. Justice, No. 88007, slip op. at 3,5.
80. Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1984).
81. Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 375 S.E.2d 747 (1989).
82. Id. at 170, 375 S.E.2d at 749.
83. Id. at 171-72, 375 S.E.2d at 749-50.
84. Id. at 170-72, 375 S.E.2d at 749.
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Prior to enactment of the Virginia Tort Claims Act in 1981,85
there seemed to be little doubt in the medical malpractice context
that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity most employees of
state hospitals exercising supervisory functions and discretionary
judgment within the scope of their employment were immune from
suit for simple negligence.8 6 In 1980, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia restricted the protection of sovereign immunity to certain
physicians by holding that attending physicians at state hospitals
are not entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity largely be-
cause of their extensive discretionary power, as compared with the
relatively small interest and involvement of the state.8 7 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia has yet to decide whether resident physi-
cians in training at state hospitals are protected by sovereign im-
munity. However, in the recent case of Gargiulo v. Ohar,88 the
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond held that a medical research
"fellow" at the Medical College of Virginia was entitled to sover-
eign immunity.89 The court based its decision on the facts that the
physician in question was in training, was carefully supervised in
her work, and did not enjoy the same freedoms with regard to se-
lection of patients, billing, and methods of treatment as did at-
tending physicians.90 The court reasoned that these factors so sig-
nificantly restricted the defendant's right to practice medicine,
unlike the attending physician in James v. Jane,91 that she should
be accorded the protection of sovereign immunity.2 The Gargiulo
decision is currently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
D. Discovery
Trial courts are occasionally called upon to rule on the discover-
ability of certain hospital documents ranging from policies and
protocols to specific incident reports. When plaintiffs request these
documents, health care providers often oppose disclosure under va-
rious theories. These theories include statutory privilege, 93 the ar-
gument being that disclosure of such information is not "reasona-
85. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.1-.9 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
86. See Lawhorne v. Harlan, 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569 (1973).
87. James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 282 S.E.2d 864 (1980).
88. Gargiulo v. Ohar, 13 Va. Cir. 225 (1988).
89. Id. at 228.
90. Id. at 227-28.
91. 221 Va. 43, 282 S.E.2d 864 (1980).
92. Gargiulo, 13 Va. Cir. at 228.
93. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.16-.17 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
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bly calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,"94
and public policy. Within the last year several decisions denied
discovery of certain hospital documents.
In Hedgepeth v. Jesudian,9 5 the plaintiff was admitted to the
hospital for a tonsillectomy and experienced oxygen deprivation
from an unknown cause. Hospital personnel near his location,
when his condition was discovered made notes about their observa-
tions. These notes were not made on incident report forms pro-
vided by the hospital's insurance carrier. The plaintiffs' attorneys
sought production of these statements. The trial court acknowl-
edged that Virginia law does not accord a privileged status to
records which relate to the hospitalization or treatment of a pa-
tient and which are kept in the ordinary course of business. 96 How-
ever, the court noted that the incident reports were not created to
aid in the treatment of the patient, but were prepared for litigation
or potential litigation and for quality assurance purposes.97 On this
basis and for reasons of public policy, the court held that the docu-
ments were privileged under sections 8.01-581.1691 and 581.1799 of
the Code of Virginia. 00 Similarly, in Leslie v. Alexander,'0° Rior-
dan v. Fairfax Hospital System, Inc.10 2 and Francis v. McEntee'03
courts ruled that incident reports, hospital policy and procedure
manuals and hospital by-laws are not discoverable.0 4
Moreover, the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond refused to
order disclosure of a psychiatrist's interview summaries and notes
with the plaintiff and her family, even though the psychiatrist had
been retained to testify concerning the standard of care.10 5
94. VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:1(b)(1).
95. Hedgepeth v. Jesudian, Nos. LM-754, LM-755 (City of Richmond Mar. 8, 1989).
96. See id. at 6; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
97. Hedgepeth, Nos. LM-754, LM-755, slip op. at 6.
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.16 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
99. Id. § 8.01-581.17 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
100. Hedgepeth, Nos. LM-754, LM-755, slip op. at 5-6.
101. 14 Va. Cir. 127 (1988).
102. No. 83762 (Fairfax County July 15, 1988).
103. 10 Va. Cir. 126 (1987).
104. But see Atkinson v. Thomas, 9 Va. Cir. 21 (1986) (incident reports prepared by hos-
pital in ordinary course of business are discoverable).
105. Reynolds v. St. Mary's Hosp., No. LL-2131-2 (City of Richmond June 27, 1988).
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E. Evidence
In general, when a defendant moves to strike the plaintiff's evi-
dence a court should grant the motion only if reasonable people
could agree that the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to support
his claim. 10 6 In the context of a medical malpractice trial, in 1989,
the Supreme Court of Virginia said that testimony by plaintiff's
two experts that the defendant's care of the patient fell beneath
the applicable standard of care, was sufficient by itself to defeat a
motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence. 0 7
Expert witnesses may rely on inadmissible evidence to form
their opinions if the evidence is normally relied upon in the ex-
pert's particular field of expertise. 08 However, the Supreme Court
of Virginia in McMunn v. Tatum,0 9 ruled that such inadmissible
evidence is not itself admissible. Therefore, on direct examination
an expert may not state inadmissible evidence upon which he re-
lied in reaching his opinion, although he may state his own
opinions." 0
F. Voir Dire
Plaintiffs' attorneys have occasionally attempted to ask potential
jurors about their opinions of the "insurance crisis" or the "medi-
cal malpractice crisis" during voir dire. The defense bar has ob-
jected that this as an attempt to inject the subject of insurance
into the trial. Plaintiffs' counsel claim that jurors should be unbi-
ased and that voir dire should permit sufficient questioning in this
area to disclose any latent bias. These competing principles were
reviewed in Speet v. Bacaj" in which the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow the plaintiff to ask
potefitial jurors about their opinions concerning the liability insur-
ance crisis. The basis for the decision was that such questioning
would improperly introduce the subject of insurance into the trial
and could use the voir dire process "as a sword rather than as a
shield.""' 2
106. Walton v. Walton, 168 Va. 418, 422, 191 S.E. 768, 770 (1937).
107. Hadeed v. Medic-24 Ltd., 237 Va. 277, 377 S.E.2d 589 (1989).
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
109. 237 Va. -, 379 S.E.2d 908 (1989).
110. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 912.
111. 237 Va. 290, 377 S.E.2d 397 (1989).
112. Id. at 295, 377 S.E.2d at 399.
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G. Medical Malpractice Review Panels
Speet v. Bacaj113 also discussed use at trial of a medical mal-
practice review panel opinion. Such opinions are limited by law to
four options which are, essentially, that there was or was not mal-
practice, which was or was not a proximate cause of alleged injury;
the panel may also defer decision of factual questions to a court or
jury.114 The panel opinion is later admissible at any trial concern-
ing the alleged malpractice. The panel may not rule on issues of
law such as sovereign immunity" 5 or jurisdiction.1 1 6 In Speet, the
trial court admitted the review panel's opinion under the provi-
sions of section 8.01-581.8 of the Code of Virginia," 7 and the plain-
tiffs challenged such evidentiary admission on the basis that it was
unconstitutional because it violated their rights to a jury trial, and
that it violated the longstanding rule that expert testimony is re-
quired in a medical malpractice case to prove the standard of
care." 8 The Supreme Court of Virginia overruled both challenges
to introduction of the opinion." 9 The court concluded that section
8.01-581.8 of the Code 20 is constitutional and does not violate the
requirement of expert testimony.'2 ' The court noted that panel
opinions are not conclusive evidence, but that both parties had re-
lied on expert witness testimony as to the standard of care and
that neither party relied solely on the panel opinion. 22
The Act provides statutory authorization for rescission of a
panel request. 2  Generally, the party which requested the panel
may rescind the request at almost any stage of the proceeding. 2 4
However, occasionally a party to a medical malpractice panel hear-
ing who did not request the panel, because his opponent did so
first, may nevertheless desire the panel. If the requesting party
later rescinds the request and sixty days have expired since the
notice of claim, the other party may find that he is therefore not
113. 237 Va. 290, 377 S.E.2d 397 (1989).
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.7 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
115. Samuel v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. Cir. 185 (1988).
116. Falat v. MCV, 14 Va. Cir. 318 (1989).
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.8 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
118. Speet, 237 Va. at 295-97, 377 S.E.2d at 399-400.
119. Id.
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.8 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
121. 237 Va. at 295-97, 377 S.E.2d at 399-400.
122. Id. at 297, 377 S.E.2d at 400.
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
124. Id.
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entitled to request a panel.125 In Reagan v. Bucur,26 the panel
chairman ruled that once a review panel is requested it can be re-
scinded only with consent of all the parties who relied upon the
initial request as a basis for not making a duplicate request.117
H. Medical Malpractice Damage Cap
1. Constitutionality of the Cap
The most significant medical malpractice decisions in recent
years came in 1989 with the cases of Etheridge v. Medical Center
Hospitals'2s and Boyd v. Bulala.'2e In Etheridge,'" by a four-to-
three margin, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Virginia cap on medical malpractice damages' 31 re-
jecting an opinion by the federal district court in Bulala, that the
cap unconstitutionally violated federal and state jury trial guaran-
tees.132 In Bulala, the Fourth Circuit, on appeal, concurred with
the Supreme Court of Virginia and reversed the district court's
decision.' 3 3
After hearing the evidence, the jury in Etheridge returned a ver-
dict of $2,750,000 against the defendant health care providers. The
trial court applied section 8.01-581.15 of the Code,"4 reduced the
verdict to the cap at the time of the alleged act of malpractice
($750,000), and entered judgment for that amount.135 The plaintiff
attacked the trial court's action on the basis that it was unconsti-
tutional because it violated her rights to a jury trial, due process of
law, and equal protection under the law. The plaintiff also asserted
that the medical malpractice cap violated the prohibition against
special legislation and the doctrine of the separation of powers of
the Virginia Constitution.'"
125. Id. § 8.01-581.2.
126. Medical Malpractice Review Panel (Arlington Co. Mar. 21, 1988).
127. See id. at 3; Buscher v. Teja, Medical Malpractice Review Panel (Augusta Co. Apr.
28, 1983).
128. 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989).
129. Nos. 88-2055, 88-2056 (4th Cir. June 12, 1989).
130. 237 Va. at 95-104, 376 S.E.2d at 529-34 (upholding the statute against federal and
state constitutional challenges).
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-58.15 (Repl. Vol. 1984). The Virginia limitation on monetary
recovery from medical malpractice actions is commonly known as the "cap," and is found in
section 8.01-581.15 of the Code of Virginia. That section originally limited recovery to
$750,000, but was later amended in 1983 to limit recovery to $1,000,000.
132. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986).
133. Boyd v. Bulala, Nos. 88-2055, 88-2056, slip op. at 8-12 (4th Cir. June 12, 1989).
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
135. Etheridge, 237 Va. at 92, 376 S.E.2d at 527.
136. Id. at 100-03, 376 S.E.2d at 531-33.
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The Bulala trial court entered judgment for $8,300,000 on a jury
verdict in that amount.'37 This included substantial damages for
loss of enjoyment of life and future medical care of a brain injured
infant who died before entry of judgment. The judgment also in-
cluded punitive damages and compensatory damages over $750,000
(the cap at the time of the alleged malpractice) to three separate
plaintiffs (a new-born and her parents).'38 The district court de-
clined to apply the cap on the basis that it violated the plaintiffs'
right to jury trial.'3 9
In Etheridge, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that the
medical malpractice cap does not violate a plaintiff's right to jury
trial because the jury's function is only to resolve disputed facts.' 40
The remedy to be applied afterward is a matter of law which may
be prescribed by the legislature.' 4' The court also found that the
statutory cap complies with the requirements of due process be-
cause such guarantee mandates only that a party be afforded rea-
sonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, which
are not denied by the cap.' 42 The court found the cap in compli-
ance with the doctrine of the separation of powers on the basis
that the remedy afforded to medical malpractice plaintiffs is a
common law remedy, the modification of which is a proper exercise
of legislative authority.43 The court further found that the cap is
not special legislation, and does not violate principles of equal pro-
tection because it bears a reasonable and substantial relation to
the object sought to be accomplished by the legislation, the allevia-
tion of the medical malpractice insurance crisis. 144 The court also
found that the requirements of equal protection were satisfied be-
cause the cap neither infringed upon a fundamental right nor cre-
ated a suspect class of affected persons.' 45 In dispensing with the
equal protection claim, the court applied a rational basis test and
137. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. at 784.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 789-90.
140. Etheridge, 237 Va. at 96-97, 376 S.E.2d at 529. Etheridge was decided after oral
argument in Bulala but before a decision was rendered by the Fourth Circuit.
141. Id. at 95-97, 376 S.E.2d at 529.
142. Id. at 97-100, 376 S.E.2d at 529-31.
143. Id. at 100-01, 376 S.E.2d at 531-32.
144. Id. at 101-03, 376 S.E.2d at 532-33.
145. Id. at 103, 376 S.E.2d at 533-34.
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since the court determined that the legislation promoted a legiti-
mate state purpose, held the cap to be constitutional.'46
In light of Etheridge, the Fourth Circuit in Bulala took the Vir-
ginia constitutional issues as settled147 and, with regard to federal
constitutional issues, also agreed that the cap offends no federal
constitutional proscriptions.
41
2. Stacking of Parties
In Etheridge, the Supreme Court of Virginia also found that the
cap prohibits the stacking of defendants to permit more than one
cap in a case. 49 The court ruled that the cap defines the maximum
amount of damages recoverable by a plaintiff in a medical mal-
practice action regardless of the number of defendants.'50 There-
fore, a single plaintiff can recover a maximum of one million dol-
lars regardless of the number of defendants.
There are still several remaining questions. One such question is
whether the Act permits the stacking of plaintiffs: for instance, if a
mother, father, and child have claims arising from the birth and
delivery of the child, may each potential plaintiff recover the full
amount of the cap? If such stacking is not allowed under the cap
statute, how should the limited award be distributed among multi-
ple plaintiffs? These issues were not addressed by the Supreme
Court of Virginia in Etheridge, but in Bulala the Fourth Circuit
certified these questions to the Supreme Court of Virginia for reso-
lution.' The Fourth Circuit also certified the questions of
whether the cap applies to damages for emotional distress, and pu-
nitive damages. 52
3. Recovery for Emotional Distress
Virginia law generally does not permit recovery of damages for
emotional distress that are not directly caused by physical in-
jury. 5' It was not until 1974 that Virginia permitted maintenance
146. Id. at 103, 376 S.E.2d at 534.
147. Bulala, Nos. 88-2055, 88-2056, slip op. at 4.
148. Id. at 9.
149. Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosp., 237 Va. 105, 107, 376 S.E.2d 534, 535 (1989).
150. Id.
151. Boyd v. Bulala, Nos. 88-2055, 88-2056, slip op. at 6 (4th Cir. June 12, 1989).
152. Id. at 21.
153. See Boyd v. Bulala, Nos. 88-2055, 88-2056, slip op. at 14 (4th Cir. June 12, 1989); see
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of a suit for infliction of emotional distress without the physical
manifestation of injury.154 It is important to note, however, that in
both Moore and Womack the wrongful conduct of the defendant
was directed at the plaintiff, not at a third party. In Womack, the
Supreme Court of Virginia, quoting with approval from Samms v.
Eccles 55 noted that the cause of action exists "'where the defend-
ant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff'
, 156
The above line of cases continued with Hughes v. Moore.157 In
Hughes, the defendant crashed his car into the plaintiff's house
which allegedly caused the plaintiff great emotional distress and
resulting physical injuries. The court held that, "where the claim is
for emotional disturbance and physical injury resulting therefrom,
there may be recovery for negligent conduct, notwithstanding the
lack of physical impact . . . ."I" The court said:
Under the rule adopted today we are not saying that a plaintiff, in
an action for negligence, may recover damages for physical injuries
resulting from fright or shock caused by witnessing injury to an-
other, allegedly occasioned by the negligence of a defendant toward
a third person, or caused by seeing the resulting injury to a third
person after it has been inflicted through defendant's negligence. 59
In Naccash v. Burger,60 the Supreme Court of Virginia relied on
the foregoing cases to permit recovery for third parties' emotional
distress on the basis that the physician who had allegedly commit-
ted malpractice owed a duty to the parents of a child that devel-
oped Tay-Sachs syndrome after birth. No Virginia decision has yet
stated that a plaintiff may recover for his or her own purely emo-
tional distress at witnessing intentional or negligent acts directed
at a third party. As stated by the Fourth Circuit, "Virginia law
does not as an independent goal try to restore mental tranquility
shaken by witnessing or contemplating negligently inflicted
injury.''161
also Moore v. Jefferson Hosp., 208 Va. 438, 158 S.E.2d 124 (1967).
154. Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974).
155. 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 (1961).
156. Womack, 215 Va. at 341, 210 S.E.2d at 148 (emphasis added).
157. 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (19,73).
158. Id. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219.
159. Id. at 34-35, 197 S.E.2d at 219-20.
160. 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982).
161. E1-Meswari v. Washington Gas Light Co., 785 F.2d 483, 488 (4th Cir. 1986).
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Based on the Naccash holding, the Fourth Circuit ruled in Bu-
lala that a father who had not even witnessed the birth of his sub-
sequently brain injured child could state a cause of action for emo-
tional distress."6 2 However, the Fourth Circuit seems to have
misinterpreted Naccash by concluding that the emotional distress
complained of in that case had been sustained upon the birth of
the defective child. 6 To the contrary, the infant in Naccash had
not been obviously defective at birth and only later was it discov-
ered that the infant suffered from a congenital condition known as
Tay-Sachs syndrome.' In so ruling, the Fourth Circuit seem to
have overlooked its previous holding in the case of El-Meswari v.
Washington Gas Light Co.,6 5 where the Fourth Circuit stated:
To confer a cause of action for distressful contemplation of negli-
gently inflicted injury, even upon an intimate relation of the injured
party, would be a portentous step. When the state supreme court
has so unmistakably announced its position, the duty of a federal
court in diversity jurisdiction is to apply the expressed law. 66
4. Bulala Issues Certified to Supreme Court of Virginia
The Fourth Circuit decision in Bulala certified a total of six
questions to the Supreme Court of Virginia, three of which concern
the cap.' These questions are: 1) Does the medical malpractice
cap permit stacking of plaintiffs and, if so, how should any recov-
ery be apportioned; 2) Does the damages cap apply to claims of
emotional distress arising from acts of medical malpractice; 3)
Does the damages cap apply to punitive damages based on acts of
medical malpractice?'6 8 The Fourth Circuit certified three other
questions not unique to medical malpractice cases: 1) Does Vir-
ginia permit damages for loss of enjoyment of life when death re-
sults from acts of medical malpractice; 2) Does Virginia permit loss
of earning capacity for a person who would never have worked and
162. Bulala, Nos. 88-2055, 88-2056, slip op. at 14-15.
163. Id. at 14.
164. Naccash, 223 Va. at 409-10, 290 S.E.2d at 827.
165. 785 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1986).
166. Id. at 488-89.




who died before entry of judgment; 3) How does the death of a
party after verdict but before entry of judgment affect the nature
of the action in terms of the wrongful death statute?' 69
III. ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Act,170 which establishes a no-fault compensation system for in-
fants with certain neurological injuries, was the subject of a study
funded by the Medical Society of Virginia.' 71 The study found that
the injuries covered by the act occurred infrequently, amounting to
0.01 percent of births statewide in 1986, and 0.003 percent of
births statewide in 1987. It also found that these injuries were
likely to be associated with normal health care problems such as
prematurity and maternal complications, rather than with
problems in treatment by physicians in hospitals. The study con-
cluded that it is questionable whether the act, which took effect on
January 1, 1988, effectively compensates families who sue to re-
cover the cost of caring for their living, neurologically injured
child.172
IV. CONCLUSION
The last year brought many long awaited developments in the
area of medical malpractice litigation. The upcoming year promises
equally important developments from pending decisions,' 3 and it
is encouraging to see the courts continuing to deal with difficult
but important issues concerning medical malpractice. Through the
efforts of the courts, the legislature and the Bar, Virginia is devel-
oping a mature body of medical malpractice law that will, hope-
fully, continue to be refined and improved.
169. Id. at 21.
170. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
171. Injured Infant Research Completed, 5 V.S.B. Sec. Health L. News 3 (P. Swisher ed.
1989).
172. Id.
173. Most notably, the certified questions in Boyd.
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